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The market for health-care services has been
described as a place where people yearning for
immortality meet the unforgiving world of
finances.Although most of the reforms, ongoing in
many countries, are hardly ever acceptable to the
citizens, many partial steps bring forth almost
immediate palpable improvements that are impor-
tant for gaining and maintaining financial stability
and trust of the society. This is the basic lesson
from Slovakia’s health-care reform.
OECD countries spend on average 8.4 percent of
their GDP (OECD 2003a) on health care. In 2003,
Slovak health-care expenditure amounted to 6.9 per-
cent of GDP, which is lower than the OECD aver-
age but slightly higher than the average of the
seven new EU member states (6.7 percent of their
GDP,WHO 2003).
The goal of the health-care policy is the financial-
ly sustainable provision and fair distribution of
health services. Fair distribution is considered a
mechanism that would provide care according to
everyone’s needs. A system is considered finan-
cially sustainable when it respects given budget
constraints, does not create conditions for the sys-
tematic accumulation of debt, and complies with
priorities of citizens and policy makers (Evans
2001).
Reasons for the reform
The socialist health care system offered its services
free at the point of delivery. However, patients
were constantly under-treated and deprived of the
latest advances in pharmacological technologies,
diagnostics and treatment.A vast network of phys-
ically available, yet inefficient hospitals was built.
Excess demand was balanced by nepotism and cor-
ruption.
At the present time, treatment in Slovakia has
already become more effective. This is shown by 
a significant growth in the mean life expectancy:
From 1990 to 2002, the annual growth was 
0.18 years for females (1960–90 only 0.10 years
annually) and 0.27 years for males (previously
–0.04 years annually). This improvement was dri-
ven mainly by increased expenditures on new tech-
nologies and pharmaceuticals, because no signifi-
cant structural changes except the privatisation of
primary and secondary care on the supply side of
the system took place between 1990 and 2002.
The health-care system used to pride itself in pro-
viding a high level of equality in access to care,
which was, furthermore, delivered for free. In real-
ity, neither of these points were true. Dis-
equilibrium on the market was corrected by infor-
mal payments, which further deepened inequalities
(OECD 2002b).
Thanks to the generous scope of benefit packages
provided, free access to health care, inherited
extensive supply, spreading of noninfectious and
chronic diseases and limited solvency, demand as
well as the supply exceeded available resources.
The high demand for health-care services can be
illustrated with the following figures: While the
annual number of physician consultations in
OECD countries was 5.6 (OECD 2003b), the num-
ber in Slovakia was 9.2. According to estimates by
the Slovak Ministry of Health, 41 tons of pre-
scribed and unused drugs are wasted each year.
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Table 1
Revenues and expenditures of the health care system
in % of GDP
Revenues Expenditures Deficit
1995 6.1 6.2 –0.1
1996 7.2 7.2 0.0
1997 7.0 7.6 –0.6
1998 6.9 7.6 –0.7
1999 6.4 6.9 –0.5
2000 6.4 7.3 –0.9
2001 6.4 7.3 –0.9
2002 6.8 7.7 –0.9
2003 6.5 6.9 –0.4
2004
e 6.4 6.6 –0.2
2005
f 6.5 6.5 0.0
e = estimated; f = forecast.
Source: Ministry of Health of the Slovak Republic.Until 2001, this inequality resulted in continuous
growth of deficits, mounting costs (Table 1) and
prolonged waiting periods. The financial problems
reached a peak in 2002. If public finances are not
capable of covering the actual costs of health care,
it is possible to react on the revenue side by
increasing private financing (co-payments by
patients via private insurance and cash payments),
on the supply side by increasing system efficiency,
and on the demand side by lowering expectations
of the patients towards the publicly financed
health-care system.1
Fundamentals of the reform
Politically, health-care system reform is a complex
issue because in the short-term there are no clear
winners: patients lose free health care, providers of
health care are deprived of soft budget constraints
and producers of technologies and pharmaceuticals
lose part of their market.The reform aims to lower
the expectations of citizens associated with the
health care system and to strengthen their responsi-
bility for their own health. From the public finance
perspective, it means the introduction of a clearly
defined system in three categories: fully covered,
partially covered and non-covered health-care.
The reform is based on a critical assessment of the
(mal-) functioning of the pre-reform system. The
most critical characteristics have been:
• Moral hazard,
• unsustainable coverage,
• dominance of soft budget constraints,
• management by physicians,and not by enterprises,
• inability of the system to react to the changing
structure of diseases.
From these functional distortions the main objec-
tives of the reform heave been derived:
1. Creating an environment supportive to incen-
tive mechanisms to improving the health of the
population, increasing the safety of treatment
and trust of patients in the health-care system.
The position of the state shifts from a health-
care services producer, price maker, network
manager and distributor of finances to the posi-
tion of a regulator.The patient takes over high-
er responsibility for her or his own health status,
including covering some prevention as well as
treatment costs. The provider takes over higher
responsibility for correct provision and quality
of health-care, including the possible risk of
penalties. A health-care insurer takes over re-
sponsibility especially for the management of
patients within the system, and solvency in pur-
chasing health-care complying with hard budget
constrains, with the risk of facing bankruptcy.
2. Maintaining balanced financing of the health-
care system.
3. Increasing the flexibility of the health-care sys-
tem so that it will respond to the needs of citi-
zens, changing environment, shifts in structures
of disease, and technological progress.
4. Providing financial protection of individuals
from so-called catastrophic expenses for health-
care.
The reform measures undertaken can be grouped
into stabilizing measures and measures of systemic
change2.
Stabilizing and systemic measures
Stabilizing measures 
First steps: The main goal of the stabilizing measures
was to stop the accumulation of debts and limit
excessive consumption of health-care services and
pharmaceuticals. To start any changes it was first of
all necessary to create a proper definition of the term
“health-care” and differentiate health-care services
proper from those services which are only related to
health-care (e.g. food, lodging and transportation).
User fees: The second new element was the intro-
duction of user fees (Table 2) for physician consul-
tations, for issuing prescriptions and providing
related services (started 1 June 2003).This step was
meant to increase the responsibility of patients for
their own health, and was not intended to secure
massive additional resources into the system. Fees
are of a symbolic nature, while certain groups of
patients, such as children under 1 year or the chron-
ically ill are exempt. Poor patients, at first, paid
lower fees; however, this proved to be administra-
tively complicated; exemptions were thus canceled
and the poor receive a monthly contribution from
the social system of SKK 50 per household mem-
ber to compensate for health expenses.
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1 For further analysis of the Slovak health sector, see Paz ˇitny ´ and
Zajac, 2002.
2 Both the stabilizing and reform measures are profoundly
described in Paz ˇitny ´ and Zajac, 2001, and then later in governmen-
tal documents in 2003 and 2004.CESifo DICE Report 1/2005 69
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The introduction of user fees led to a 10 percent
decline in visits to general practitioners and a 
13 percent decline in first aid calls (Table 3). Inter-
estingly, the public does not complain that these
fees jeopardize the access to care. According to a
public poll in January 2004, only 1.5 percent of re-
spondents (FOCUS January 2004) claimed that
they stopped visiting the doctor after the introduc-
tion of user fees. This means that user fees were
able to reduce artificial demand with only a negli-
gible impact on the patients. The lower number of
visits might also lead to higher quality of care,
because physicians can devote more time to seri-
ous illnesses. Fees thus had the effect of reducing
excessive demand, while concerns about compro-
mised availability of care proved to be unjustified.
The introduction of fees improved cash income of
physicians by SKK 7,000–9,000 per month. Payments
in hospitals for food and lodging
provided patients with incentives
to demand higher quality of ser-
vices. The significant immediate
effect is that patients started to
feel that health-care is not free of
charge (source: similar polls as
mentioned above).
Another likely impact of intro-
ducing fees was a drop in corrup-
tion.While in November 2002 as many as 32 percent
of respondents associated health-care with corrup-
tion, in January 2004 it was only 10 percent. There
was a drop in the frequency of providing bribes
and gifts – to specialists from 18 percent in summer
2002 to 14 percent in the autumn 2003, and in hos-
pitals from 14 percent to 11 percent respectively
over the same period (source: public opinion polls
in 2002 and 2004).
The general design of the new system of user fees
was further developed and ended up with a com-
plex co-payment scheme, which is part of the
Reform Acts with the following main objectives3:
Table 2
User fees introduced since 1 June 2003
Type of care/provider User Fee Per Who keeps it?
Primary outpatient care SKK 20 visit Doctor
Specialized outpatient care SKK 20 visit Specialist
Hospital (i.e. room and board) SKK 50 day Hospital
Transport SKK 2 km Transport
Prescription SKK 20 Prescription SKK 5:pharmacy;
SKK 15: HIC
Source: Ministry of Health (2003).
Table 3
Number of visits per quarter in 2002 and 2003











1 Q 2002 3,955,031 652,062 219,141 3,391,103 206,352 33,015
2 Q 2002 3,867,676 640,379 241,975 3,361,904 196,638 33,742
3 Q 2002 3,457,192 558,015 254,146 2,965,542 189,765 30,987
4 Q 2002 3,892,173 620,004 250,615 3,241,337 193,305 29,582
2002 15,172,072 2,470,460 965,877 12,959,886 786,060 127,326
1 Q 2003 4,141,886 638,254 260,616 3,371,764 196,378 31,496
2 Q 2003 3,619,596 623,961 235,854 3,302,044 199,175 34,821
3 Q 2003 3,042,471 542,567 219,884 2,867,805 185,309 32,313
4 Q 2003 3,596,287 621,555 219,419 3,216,420 189,156 32,197
2003 14,400,240 2,426,337 935,773 12,758,033 770,018 130,827
Relationof 2004 to 2003
1 Q 1.05 0.98 1.19 0.99 0.95 0.95
2 Q 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.98 1.01 1.03
3 Q 0.88 0.97 0.87 0.97 0.98 1.04
4 Q 0.92 1.00 0.88 0.99 0.98 1.09
Year 0.95 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 1.03
Source: VšZP (General Health Insurance Company).
3 The fundamental points of the general design of the system of
user fees was discussed during a conference on health-care reform
in Bratislava in 2004. The issues raised by Osterkamp’s presenta-
tion on the subject (Osterkamp 2004) were influential in shaping
the final design of the system.1. Separation of non-healt-care services (setting
minimal flat user fees).
2. Definition of the national priority list (uninsur-
able risks that are costly,rare and severe diseases)
with no co-payment only user fees that are
approved by the parliament.Currently 6,700 diag-
noses..
3. Establishing catalogization committees for
defining the catalogue of procedures for every
diagnosis.
4. Establishing categorization commissions that
define the financial co-payment on the non-prior
diagnosis (currently 4,300 diagnoses, which are
cheap and privately insurable).
5. Increasing the patient’s responsibility and
involvement by setting rules on compliance and
misuse of health-care.
Pharmaceutical policy: The third stabilizing mea-
sure has focused on pharmaceutical policy. Several
measures have been taken to support the decrease
of drug expenditures both as a result of price and
volume decrease:
1. Introduction of user fees for drug prescription
(SKK 20).
2. Introduction of a fixed ratio after categorization
(since June 2003). If a phar-
maceutical company decreas-
es the price of a drug after
the positive list is published,
then the ratio between the
reimbursement (paid by the
Health Insurance Company)
and co-payment (paid by the
patient) must remain the
same.
3. Introducing personal changes
in the structure of categoriza-
tion committee, favoring eco-
nomists before doctors (since
June 2003).
4. Changes in the process of set-
ting maximal prices.
5. Price negotiations via internet –
introducing transparent market
mechanisms with clear rules.
6. Changes in margins for whole-
salers and pharmacies for
“very expensive” drugs. The
definition of “very expensive
drug” is more flexible than
fixed (depending on dosage),
but it corresponds approxi-
mately to drugs more expensive than SKK 20 000
per month.
7. Higher frequency of categorization and the
reimbursement process. It now takes place four
times a year, instead of once annually before
2003.The result of the categorization committee
is a positive list stating the reimbursements and
is published 4 times a year. In adopting these
rules Slovakia is attempting to follow the EU
legislation on drug reimbursement in terms of
the Transparency Directive 89/105/EEC.
8. Introduction of a “fast track” regime in drug
policy.
“Fast track” means that for a drug in question
there is no requirement for a price evaluation by
the reimbursement committee. The fast track pro-
cedure is granted,when a pharmaceutical company
decreases the price of a product by 10 percent or
more compared to the cheapest drug in the cluster
(based on: active substance, route of application,
pharmaceutical form and strength). Having one
drug of the cluster on the “fast track”leads to price
reductions for the other drugs in the cluster.
Moreover, the patients benefit from using the fast
track drug.Table 4 gives an example.
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Table 4







Current status of drugs A, B, C 1,000 800 200
Normal price decrease of drug A
before introduction of fast track 800 640 160
Fast track of drug A with 25% 
bonus 800 680 120
The status of drugs B and C after
fast track of drug A 1,000 680 320
Result A-(B and C): Clear compar-
ative advantage of drug A –200 0 –200
Source: Ministry of Health, 2004.
Table 5







15 Nov. 2003 180.0
1 Feb. 2004 160.0 –11.1 1st generic entered the
market
15 March 2004 144.0 –10.0
1 May 2004 80.0 –44.4 2
nd generic entered the
market
1J u l y2 0 0 4 68.4 –14.5
1 October 2004 44.1 –35.5 Totaldecrease –75.5%
Source: Ministry of Health, 2004.CESifo DICE Report 1/2005 71
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The fast track procedure led to a significant price
reduction. Table 5 gives an example for a specific
drug.
Decrease in prices and volumes of pharmaceuticals
led to a substantial slowdown in the growth of
expenditures allocated to drugs. While in previous
years that growth was regularly in the double dig-
its,in 2003 it dropped to 8.9 percent.Figures for the
first half of 2004 were also encouraging, with drug
expenditures falling by 11 percent year-on-year
(Table 6).
Restructuring of hospitals: Fourth, the decentral-
ization of selected hospitals made their restructur-
ing process faster. At the same time, big hospital
complexes in two large cities, Bratislava and
Kosice, were consolidated, resulting in the sale of
several buildings. Transferring hospitals to munici-
palities and regions led to their better monitoring
and management. It seems that the changes and
expectations of further changes provide incentives
for self-governing processes in hospitals. The
restructuralization path has been supported by
decreasing the number of beds and by a strong re-
duction in employment in the health sector in the
last two years (Table 7).
Five main sources for cost savings can be identified
(Table 8). The stabilizing measures brought an
annual savings of SKK 4.0 billion in 2003 and an
estimated savings of SKK 6.4 billion in 2004, espe-
cially by reducing induced excessive demand.
While in 2000–02 the new uncovered debt was
growing by the average annual rate of SKK 7.0–9.0
billion (approx. 0.9 percent of GDP), despite
injecting SKK 10.5 billion during 2000–02, in 2003
there was a SKK 4.8 billion growth and in 2004 the
Ministry expects only SKK 2.4 billion.The adopted
reforms have led to stricter adherence to budget
constraints. After the adoption of systemic reform
and its implementation in 2005 and 2006, the
Ministry expects a balanced system with zero
growth of debts. Due to the reduced costs of health-
care there was a significant decline in growth of
indebtedness.
Systemic measures
The central goal of the systemic measures is to cre-
ate a new system for providing health-care that
would be fair and financially sustainable.
The political background: The adoption of the sys-
temic measures, known also as “The Reform
Puzzle”, in such a sensitive area as healthcare can-
not be described as the great political success of a
minority government with only 68 out of 150 mem-
bers in parliament. 81–88 MPs, depending on the
specific act, voted for the reforms. This also shows
the necessity for the government to find a political
consensus with the independent MPs on the
reform.
The objective of systemic measures is to create a
new system of providing health-care,fair in distrib-
uting health-care services and commodities and
financially sustainable in the long-run. Unlike in
other areas of public finances, there is no bench-
mark of best practices for health-care. Therefore,




















Number of beds andhealth-care employees
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
e 2005
f
Number of beds per 1000 inhabitants* 6.6 6.2 6.1 6.0 5.8 5.6 5.2
Employees inhealth sector 118,473 120,773 116,938 113,734 106,523 99,900 n.a.
Nominal annual change +2,300 –3,835 –3,204 –7,211 –6,623 n.a.
Change per year in % +1.9 –3.2 –2.7 –6.3 –6.2 –
* without psychiatric beds; e = estimate; f = forecast of authors.
Source: Statistical Office of Slovak Republic.The new system contains first of all definitions of
insurance, insurance companies, providers, health-
care, and the basic package of care. The hottest
political debates centered on two questions. First
the question of constitutional compatibility of the
Act on Scope of Health-Care which reduced the
part of health costs to be covered by public health
insurance, and second on the transformation of the
Health Insurance Companies from public funds
into joint stock companies.
Health-care insurance and supervision: The basic
function of health-care insurance is to generate
resources based on the solidarity principle. That
means specifically that also those risks must be
covered which have already occurred and are,thus,
not insurable under market conditions (or insur-
able only for a premium which is equal to the costs
of treatment).
Public health-care insurance is based on the fol-
lowing principles:
1. Universality and solidarity. Every citizen has
guaranteed access to equal treatment for an
equal need regardless of one’s social standing or
income.
2. The necessary financial means are collected
from the public on an obligatory basis and redis-
tributed on the basis of the solidarity principle,
while there is competition between providers of
social insurance. The Health-Care Supervision
Authority (HCSA) shall supervise the redistrib
ution of the financial resour-
ces between the Health Insur-
ance Companies. The effec-
tive rate of redistribution 
should reach 85.5 percent of
the prescribed insurance pre-
miums.
3. Every insured person is guar-
anteed free choice of the
health-care insurance compa-
ny, which cannot refuse insur-
ance to anyone.
4. Contributions are 14 percent
of wages up to a given ceiling
(three times the average wage).
The state pays 4 percent of
average wages for vulnerable
groups.
Additional individual health-care
insurance is allowed. It reimburs-
es the costs of treatments that are not paid by public
health-care insurance. Individual health-care insur-
ance is a product that is to be offered by commercial
insurance companies.These will be supervised by the
Financial Market Authority.
The goal is to introduce hard budget constraints,
transparent financial relationships and transfer
responsibility for patient management onto Health
Insurance Companies (HIC). HIC must obtain a
license from HCSA and are joint-stock companies,
i.e. entities of private law. HIC are allowed to gen-
erate profits – however, if there are waiting lists in
place, up to 100 percent of the profits must be used
for the benefit of those on the waiting list. The
state is the 100 percent owner of the largest HIC
(2/3 of the market) and a specialized HIC for army
and policemen (8 percent of the market), both are
also joint stock companies. There are three other
HIC on the market with approximately 26 percent
market share who have private owners.
Health insurance companies work under supervi-
sion of the HCSA, which is funded by their con-
tributions.The authority issues licenses and super-
vises solvency and the performance of the HIC.
Solvency, i.e. the ratio of own resources to rev-
enues from insurance after redistribution, must
not fall under 3 percent. If necessary, the authori-
ty may issue fines and order a remedy plan,forced
administration or liquidation of insurance com-
panies.
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Table 8








Decentralization and establishment 
of NGOs January 03 1.3 1.0
New definition of health care and
introducing fees for physician
consultations and pharmaceuticals
June 03 2.3 3.6
Introducing amendments to
contracts of hospital directors October 03 0.1 0.5
Restructuring hospitals in Bratislava
and Košice October 03 0.1 0.4
Pharmaceutical policy November 03 0.2 0.9
Total savings 4.0 6.4
Expenditures on Health 82.2 85.8
Total savings as a % of total
expenditures 4.9 7.5
e = estimate.
Source: SlovakRepublic Ministry of Health, 2003, and calculations by the
authors.CESifo DICE Report 1/2005 73
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The act aims at stimulating competitiveness and
introducing market rules for health-care insurance
and provision. Currently, health-care providers
claim finances from HICs for services provided,
regardless of their quality, efficiency or competi-
tiveness. In future, patient management will bring
about higher competitiveness and change in pay-
ment mechanisms from service mix to case mix.
The selection of providers by HIC is allowed,while
respecting the minimum network and quality stan-
dards.Together with modern payment mechanisms
these shall be the principal tools of competition.
HIC shall not compete in collecting contributions
for public insurance, but in the efficient purchasing
of health-care.We presume that managed care will
appear, as well as organizations similar to HMO.
The act introduces clear rules for handling finances
for health-care to avoid inefficient and discrimina-
tory behavior of HIC towards health-care provi-
ders.The act also changes the role of the state which
is only to formulate the health-care policy, to set
health-care priorities, to regulate and to control.
Health-care providers: The goal is to increase the
decision-making autonomy and responsibility of
providers. At the same time, the controlling and
supervisory function of the state is strengthened.
The new system is based on the following princi-
ples. First, artificial barriers to entry erected by
professional chambers are to be eliminated. Se-
cond, new types of health-care providers, like
providers of one-day care and houses of custodian
care, are to be introduced.Third, the number, posi-
tion and tasks of professional organizations in
health-care are to be regulated. Compulsory regis-
tration and membership of health-care profession-
als in chambers as the condition for practice is to
be abandoned. However, at the same time compul-
sory registration with the supervisory authority is
necessary to ensure continuous retention and
renewal of professional competence.
Very important is the new definition of the public
network of health-care providers. HIC are allowed
to sign contracts directly with providers, but must
observe the condition of a minimal public network,
related to the regional demographic situation. The
minimal public network is set by the ministry as the
minimal number of providers in a given field of
specialization in a given geographical area.The su-
pervision authority and local government authori-
ties have to monitor whether HICs contract the pre-
defined minimum number of health-care providers.
There will be contract-based and other providers
functioning within the system. While a contract-
based provider will be reimbursed directly by the
HIC and the patient will pay only a user fee (SKK
20 or 50), other providers will charge costs directly
to the patients. Following a prior consultation, the
patient may ask HIC for reimbursement, but only
up to the amount of usual reimbursement of the
contracted provider. The hospitals and other bud-
getary or state owned facilities providing health-
care will be transformed to joint-stock companies,
with minimal 51 percent state ownership.
Redefining the scope of benefits covered by public
health insurance: The definition of a specific scope
of benefits which is covered by the public health
insurance companies is derived from the principle
that an insured person has the right to equal treat-
ment in case of an equal need. Due to the infinite
nature of needs it is, however, necessary to define a
certain maximum extent of care – the benefit pack-
age – based on a list of priorities that is in line with
the fiscal capacity of the Slovak economy.Therefore
a clear policy of rationing has to be implemented.
The presently applied “silent” rationing is becoming
a serious ethical problem and source of corruption.
Decision making is done in a micro-level system, i.e.
by physicians.The solution would be to replace it by
explicit rationing, i.e. define clear and transparent
rules binding for every participant in the system
while respecting medical, ethical and economical cri-
teria and maintaining the quality of health-care.
The definition of priorities is arrived at in three
steps which redefine the mechanism of defining,
cataloging and categorization of sicknesses and the
related benefits provided.
The effects of redefining the list of priority dis-
eases is shown in Table 9.The priority list contains
approximately 6,700 diagnoses,which is almost two
thirds of the total list of diagnoses (11,000) listed in
ICD 10. Provided prices and demand remain con-
stant, patients would pay in total almost SKK 3 bil-
lion for non-priority treatments. This creates a
market for commercial health insurance compa-
nies. The average co-payment for the patients per
diagnosis per case would reach approximately
SKK 50–200.Conclusion and outlook
Reforming the health-care sys-
tem requires not only a clear
concept but also the execution
of a number of detailed steps,
the description of which was
beyond the scope of this article.
Yet even immediate changes in
management could lead to sub-
stantial savings and improved
care. However, no concept can
be successful without public and
political support. Although the
majority of changes do not have
clear winners in the short term –
direct expenditures by patients
are increasing,while revenues of
strong interest groups are de-
clining (e.g. pharmaceutical in-
dustry) – many partial steps
bring forth almost immediate
palpable improvements that are
important for winning and re-
taining public trust.
Table 10 shows that health-care
costs of private households have
indeed increased but remain a
small part of total private con-
sumption.
Since 2002 the fiscal position of
the public health-care sector in
Slovakia has improved consider-
ably at a constant rate. It is ex-
pected that the system will reach
financial stability from 2005 on-
wards (Table 11).
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Number of diagnoses ICD 10 6,700 4,300 11,000
Present volume of payments
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Table 10 
Private household expenses for health-care







st half of the
year, in SKK
87 95 102 135 242
Total health
 in SKK million 6,354 7,856 8,440 10,209 7,694 15,500
Total consumption 
 in SKK million 519,596 577,522 623 146 667 453 356,889 715,000
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of total consump-
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Total resources inhealth care sector 75.0 77.4 83.4 91.1
HIC 57.0 58.6 62.6 71.6
MOH (without payments to HIC)
and other budgetary chapters 4.7 4.8 4.8 3.5
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Health expenditures as % of GDP 7.7 6.9 6.6 6.5
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